DIVIDEND DISTRIBUTION
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RECEIVED DEDUCTIONS BY
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MATTERS
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The two-tiered tax system raises special problems in determining
what amount is to be taxed to corporate distributees, how that
amount should be determined, and what opportunities for tax
avoidance exist. The Senate Finance Committee Staff Report identified areas of abuse in retaining the concept of "earnings and profits," which is the primefactor in measuring ordinaryincome on corporate distributions to shareholders. The report identified abuses,
including complexity in the concept of earnings and profits (which
must be distinguished from both taxable income and income for
financial accountingpurposes), potentialfor manipulation in determining what is chargeable to "capital account" on stock redemptions, and use of certain accounting methods (such as the completed
contract method), which allow complete elimination of earning and
profits where deferred income and accelerated deductions are apparently allowed.
Professor Blum advocates repeal of the "earnings and profits"
limitation on dividend income. After tracing some of the early history which was directed at other problems, such as timing, Blum
concludes that taxing most corporate distributionsof a corporation
would eliminate a needless intermediate step of defining earnings
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and profits, which serves only to complicate the double-tax regime.
The dividends received deduction of section 243 (85% of dividends received by one domestic corporationfrom another)was originally thought to prevent multiple taxation of the same profit. However, here too, abuses have surfaced. For example, a corporation
has substantial business income and borrows $100,000 at 12% interest; it then invests the proceeds in preferredstock of another corporation, which pays a 10% dividend. The $10,000 dividend received is subject to an 85% deduction of $8,500; the $12,000
interest paid produces a tax loss of $10,500, even though it has a
cash flow shortfall of $2,000, resulting in a tax savings of over
$5,000. These types of distortions have been utilized by oil companies using royalty trusts to parlay ordinary income into capital gain
and with the aid of the 85% deduction some corporations,as Howard G. Krane describes, have been able to convert some income to
short term capital losses.
Lawrence M. Stone opposes repeal of the "earnings and profits"
concept to deal with Wall Street (and Chicago) gimmicks, recommending instead that we move toward a fundamental change in corporate taxation, includinga system of integration,where the impact
of the two-tiered tax on corporate income would give way to some
type of single-tax scheme. [See discussion of integrationproposals
by Professors Andrews, Warren, and Cohen infra.] Stone asserts
that the principal opponents of integration are corporate management groups who oppose large distributions of potential working
capital to shareholders, many of whom would prefer accumulation
of earnings and ultimate capital gain. Stone feels the more we attempt to curb abuses under the present system, the greater the
chance the system, as a whole, will collapse. He feels that Congress
should not be so quick to react to a few celebrated abuses by patchquilt measures.

REPEAL OF THE "EARNINGS

& PROFITS"

CONCEPT: THE LIMITATION OF THE
EXTENT TO WHICH DIVIDENDS WILL BE
TAXED AS ORDINARY INCOME

WALTER J. BLUM*

My topic is "The Limitation on Income from Dividends" or, better put, "The Limitation on the Extent to which Dividends will be
Taxed as Ordinary Income." This statutory limitation has two
prongs. If there is a distribution in the nature of a dividend, it will
not be treated as ordinary income to the recipient unless the distributing corporation has either current earnings and profits (meaning
earnings and profits in the current year) or has accumulated earnings and profits. If the dividend is neither covered by current nor
accumulated earnings and profits, then the distribution will be treated first as basis reduction to the recipient and, after basis is recovered in full, the remainder as capital gain.
Over the years, a now widely held view has grown inside the tax
world to explain this dividend limitation. In general, the explanation
is that there cannot be dividend income to shareholders unless the
distributing corporation has been profitable. If the corporation has
not been profitable, the shareholder must be receiving something in
the nature of a return of his investment or a profit on his investment;
such receipts are not taxed as ordinary income.
It is my position that we would advance the cause of rationality,
simplicity, and harmony in taxation by repealing outright the dividend limitation. What follows are some thoughts in support of
* Wilson-Dickinson Professor of Law, University of Chicago; J.D., 1941, University of Chicago.
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repeal.
Begin with the history of the limitation itself. The major developments are contained in two pieces of legislation. The first dates back
to 1916. A provision was enacted to the effect that absent corporate
earnings and profits registered after March 1, 1913, a distribution to
shareholders is not to be treated as ordinary dividend income. One
might think that this supports the general understanding I stated at
the outset. The record, however, suggests that the center of attention
in the legislature was on the time factor. Congress, in brief, did not
want to have the experience of corporations prior to the effective
date of the individual income tax -

March 1, 1913 -

count in

ascertaining what distributions are taxable as dividends. For this
reason the statute as amended referred to the earnings and profits
position of corporations after March 1, 1913.
The second major development occurred in 1936. Congress then
distinguished between accumulated earnings and profits (or accumulated deficits) and current earnings and profits. One might conclude
that this refinement also indicated the legislators shared the tax society's common understanding of the limitation. Once again, the record seems to reveal a different focus. In 1936, a tax on the undistributed income of corporations was enacted. A problem was presented
by a deficit corporation that had earnings and profits in the current
year. If it distributed an amount covered by the current earnings and
profits, but still had a deficit after the distribution, did it distribute
its earnings and profits in view of the fact that it ended the year with
a deficit? Congress enabled the corporation to escape the new tax by
allowing it to take into account any distribution out of current earnings and profits. The aim of Congress in all this was narrow and
associated with the tax on undistributed profits. Thus, history shows
that little attention was paid to the question why a general limitation
on dividend income is sensible for a tax on income - particularly a
tax on the income of individuals.
Apart from the historical record, there is support for the position
that the general limitation is not in harmony with the basic structure
of our tax law. Reflect on distributions by corporations, putting aside
the limitation on dividends. The law divides these distributions into
two major categories. One consists of payouts usually referred to as
a dividend, by which we mean a return on the investment (or basis)
that a shareholder has in his shares. The other consists of distributions by the corporation which we think of as cashing out some or all
of the stockholder's investment in his shares. The shareholder is regarded as though he had sold part or all of his shares in the corporation. The most common example of this pattern is a substantially
disproportionate redemption - that is, a redemption that leaves the
shareholder with a percentage of the stock substantially smaller than
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the percentage he owned before the redemption took place. Another
illustration is a partial liquidation of the corporation in the form of a
corporate contraction - that is, a transaction in which the corporation reduces its trade and business activities to a significant extent
and either (1) thereby generates cash and then makes a distribution
of the cash to the shareholders, or (2) makes a distribution in kind of
the unwanted assets.
On the basis of this distinction between pay-outs which are in the
nature of sales to the corporation and pay-outs in the nature of dividends to those invested in the shares, there is no compelling reason
to impose a limitation on the taxable treatment of the dividends.
Why so? As I see it, the person who invests in shares is not making
an investment in the corporate position. For example, suppose an individual buys shares of General Motors stock on the market, while
sometime later the company declares and pays a dividend of a dollar
a share. From the individual's point of view, that dividend is a return
on investment in the General Motors stock. The average investor
would think it odd to inquire whether General Motors has current
earnings and profits or past earnings and profits. Looking at the circumstances of this distribution, it is enough that the individual is
assured it does not represent a substantially disproportionate reduction in his interest in General Motors and it does not reflect a payment associated with a significant contraction in a trade or business
being conducted by General Motors. Whether the corporation has
earnings and profits should be irrelevant in determining the individual's taxable income in the supposed situation.
Repeal of the dividend limitation, by and large, would not have
jarring effects on shareholders. I could conceive of a few exceptions
to this proposition. It should be remembered, however, that almost
every change that takes place in the taxation of corporations or
shareholders might be jarring to some participants. My general assertion here is that, all things considered, this change would rate
very low on a scale of upset to taxpayers.
While my proposed change is simple, the existing limitation results in great complexities and difficult issues. Notably, the two
prongs of the present test (either current earnings and profits or accumulated earnings and profits, which both lead to ordinary income
treatment of dividends) have never fit together well; and there is no
way of making them do so. To illustrate, take a corporation that has
a very large accumulated deficit. This year is an absolutely banner
one for the company, but the expectation is that next year it will

again lose money or, at best, break even. Think of the planning that
is invited. If the corporation makes a distribution to shareholders this
year (the banner earnings year) the payout will be taxed to the
shareholders as ordinary income. If instead it holds up paying a dividend until next year - and aggregates the profits of this banner
year with the deficit that had already been accumulated, still leaving
the company with a deficit - the distribution to shareholders will be
subject to the limitation on dividend income. What position will the
shareholders be in? They will be treated as having a return of basis
and then capital gain rather than ordinary income. The connection
between the two prongs of the limitation invites game-playing, and
the strategy is unseemly.
Moreover, the limitation on dividend income necessarily calls for
generating a vast host of rules. Let me quickly run through four or
five illustrations, keeping in mind that many more puzzles could
readily be added to the list.
The starting point is to solve the basic question of how the rules
for determining earnings and profits relate to the rules for computing
taxable income or deductible loss. To what degree are we to be
bound by the same accounting rules in computing taxable income or
loss and in computing the positive or negative earnings and profits of
a corporation? Every time an accounting rule or convention is used
in calculating the profit or loss of the corporation for purposes of the
corporate income tax, we might need to know whether the same rule
or convention is to be used in computing the earnings and profits of
that corporation.
Think of a typical corporate redemption. Let us assume that one
shareholder is totally redeemed. Assume also that at the time of the
redemption the corporation has paid-in capital, an earned surplus,
and a large amount of unrealized appreciation on its assets. Dollars
are distributed by the corporation to the redeemed shareholder. To
what extent do these dollars come out of paid-in capital, out of the
earned surplus, and out of the unrealized and unrecognized appreciation in the assets of the corporation? This question has troubled the
tax system for many decades.
Take the case of a corporate separation, where one corporation is
divided up pursuant to a procedure that qualifies as a spin-off, splitoff or a split-up. The accumulated earnings and profits or accumulated deficit of the intact corporation then must be divided between
the various corporations that emerge as a result of the corporate restructuring. But it is unclear whether that division should be along
the lines of the net asset values in the various corporations, or the
aggregate net basis of the assets that go into the corporations, or the
prior profitability of the operations put into the corporations, or some
combination of these three different concepts.
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Take corporate acquisitions, and focus on a corporation that is
very successful, having large earnings and profits. It is acquired by a
corporation with an even larger accumulated deficit. Under these circumstances, do the accumulated earnings and profits of the profitable corporation disappear? Or do they go over to and survive in the
corporation with the deficit? Now reverse the transaction, so that the
deficit corporation is acquired by the profitable entity. Can the profitable corporation offset its accumulated earnings and profits with
the deficit of the corporation it has acquired? These are very troublesome issues.
Let me complicate the matter even more. Suppose an acquisition
qualifies as a tax-free reorganization. The consideration given in the
transaction consists of shares in the acquiring corporation and some
boot in the form of cash. Assume that the boot is in the nature of a
dividend. Which corporation is to be considered in deciding whether
there are current earnings and profits or accumulated earnings and
profits to cover the dividend-like boot? Do we look at the earnings
and profits of the acquired corporation or of the acquiring corporation or a combination of the two?
Turning to a more common type of case, suppose a corporation
has an accumulated deficit going into the current year, which happens to be profitable. Further suppose that dividends are distributed
this year, but in the aggregate they are in excess of the earnings and
profits for the year. During the year, shares have changed hands
many times. At some times it looked as though the corporation
would be very profitable for the whole year, while at other times it
looked as though the profit would be modest. Which of the numerous
shareholders who held shares only for part of the year will qualify
for being protected by the limitation on dividend income?
In a nutshell, there are a multitude of difficult problems that have
to be resolved in defining earnings and profits for purposes of operating the limitation on dividend income. To make matters worse, this
is one area in tax law in which there is no statute of limitations at
work. If there is a situation in which shareholders of a corporation
are claiming that recent dividends to some extent are protected by
the limitation, it might be necessary to dig into the corporate history
to trace the accumulation of earnings and profits. This might require
running through all the redemption transactions, all the acquisition
transactions, and all the corporate division transactions in which the
corporation was involved. In doing so, one has to play by the rules
that were then in force at the time the division, the acquisition, the

redemption or other event took place. What a marvelous job for
accountants!
At this point I must reveal that a Lexis print-out I now have in
my hand shows that the term "earnings and profits" is used in the
Code in well over 200 places other than in section 316 - which
prescribes the limitation on dividend income.' And so you might
rightfully ask this question: if we do away with the limitation on
dividend income, will we not somehow torpedo these other provisions? After checking into each reference, I have concluded, with
one or two possible exceptions involving foreign income (and I am
not sure about these), that it would be possible to abolish the limitation on dividend income without in any way undermining the other
provisions that make use of an earnings and profits concept. Indeed,
I would like to push this conclusion a step further. By doing away
with the limitation, we likely would be in a position to have more
appropriate provisions in some of the other sections - provisions
that are more responsive in dealing with the problems that gave rise
to the particular statutory enactments.
I am aware that the topic for this conference was thought to be
timely because Congress is about to consider proposed new legislation bearing on fundamental relationships in the taxation of corporations and shareholders. 2 It is therefore germane to inquire: why talk
about the limitation on dividend income at this time? The answer is
that the proposed new legislation would make some rather far-reaching changes in how earnings and profits are defined for purposes of
the dividend limitation. All of these changes move in the direction of
defining earnings and profits not in a way that is grounded on the
notion of taxable income, but on a notion of income in some economic sense of the concept.
To illustrate: consider a corporation that is making significant use
of the accelerated cost recovery system. As a result it is able to eliminate its current earnings and profits (or at least hold them down to
a very low level). Assume further that it has no accumulated earnings and profits. Thus, it is in a position to make distributions of
dividends which will not be taxed as ordinary income. You can see
why those who are looking for errors or misguided provisions in the
Code might well argue that a change is needed in the definition of
earnings and profits for purposes of the dividend limitation. Such a
change would expand the definition of earnings and profits. For example, the difference in amount between ordinary depreciation deductions and accelerated cost recovery deductions would be added
1. I.R.C. § 316 (1982).
2. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (Tax Reform Act of 1984), Pub. L. No. 98-369,
98 Stat. 494 (1984).
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into earnings and profits. Take another illustration: if the corporation
is reporting the sale of an appreciated asset on the installment basis,
under the enlarged definition the corporation in the year of sale
would be required to pick up in its earnings and profits (but not in
its taxable income) the full amount of profit on that sale, thereby
lessening the force of the limitation. By shifting the definition from
taxable income to a version of economic income, fewer dividends will
come under the limitation and hence be exempt from all ordinary
income tax.
On initial impression this modification might seem sound. But let
us go back to those other provisions in the Code that deal with earnings and profits. Many of them, indeed some central ones, are handling a large problem that is unrelated to the dividend limitation.
The problem might best be grasped by focusing on transactions between corporations that are in the same corporate empire. The corporations may be filing consolidated returns or separate returns may
be being filed by a parent and a completely owned subsidiary. The
subsidiary pays a dividend to the parent, or inside of the consolidated
returns groups a dividend is paid by one corporation to another.
In these situations we might want to avoid imposing a double tax
at the corporate level on the same income. But we likewise, might
not want these dividends to reduce tax at the corporate level. In general, the earnings and profits notion has been utilized to accomplish
these goals. It should be apparent that for these purposes the relevant definition or concept of earnings and profits is linked to taxable
income. Since the object is to prevent double taxation or prevent
something from escaping tax, the yardstick ought to be based on taxable income and not on some measure of economic income.
This point is important in assessing the proposed legislation. If we
drastically change the definition of earnings and profits for purposes
of the limitation on dividend income, we eventually will end up not
with one concept of earnings and profits, but two widely different
concepts - one for purposes of the dividend limitation and another
for purposes of various inter-corporate transactions, such as those
taking place within the same corporate empire.
Earlier, I emphasized that the earnings and profits limitation is
already extremely complicated. We seem to be headed in the direction of having a second earnings and profits notion, equally complicated, but applied in different situations. There is, however, an easy
way out of this trap. It is to adopt my proposal to repeal the dividend
limitation altogether and then address specifically the problems en-

countered in certain inter-corporate transactions, such as those
within the same corporate empire. We would end up with a single
earnings and profits notion - a concept that is targeted to the specific problems that strongly call for attention. Perhaps we might find
that in trying to prevent double corporate taxation, it is better to
abandon the earnings and profits notion and build on some other
principle, such as adjusting the basis of assets.
I must acknowledge that my proposal might produce hardships in
some situations. It may be prudent to make an exception in limited
cases. Let me quickly describe three of them to convey the gist of
what I have in mind.
Suppose the four of us on the panel decide to form a corporation,
believing the company will need $400,000 of equity capital. We each
put in $100,000. Six months later it turns out the corporation doesn't
need $400,000; $200,000 will do the trick. So $200,000 is returned
to us, divided among the four in proportion to our holding of shares.
Where there has been an overcommitment of capital to the corporation and the excess capital is returned within a relatively brief time
to the shareholders who contributed it, some kind of relief mechanism might be in order.
Assume that a corporation declares a dividend under some mistaken assumption about the facts. Perhaps we should allow the dividend to be rescinded and returned to the corporation without imposing ordinary income treatment on the shareholders who received it.
Troubling, although important, are some corporations that are primarily mineral operations. In effect, they are in the process of liquidating over a period of time by virtue of not replacing their mineral
resources as they become depleted. In that case, the problem might
be handled by allowing some kind of set-off against dividends in order to reflect the fact that the depletion reserve, so to speak, is being
distributed to the shareholders.
But these are relatively minor matters. They do not, by any
means, undercut my major proposition that the dividend limitation
should be repealed.
Before ending, I want to present some figures that bolster my case.
I asked our law librarian to ascertain how many pages of the Commerce Clearing House Standard Federal Tax Service 3 are devoted to
section 312(a), 4 which defines the basic concept of earnings and
profits, and how many to section 316,5 which prescribes the dividend
limitation. She counted fifty-seven pages given over to 312(a) and
111 pages on 316. I then asked her to query Lexis on how many
3.

1984 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH), Vol. 1-10.

4. I.R.C. § 312(a) (1982).
5. I.R.C. § 316 (1982).
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articles and comments have been published between 1954 and the
present time on these two sections. It turns out there were fifty-four
articles and comments under section 312 and a total of 128 under
section 316(a). From these figures you might get some sense of the
magnitude of the complexities that we now face. Finally, I asked her
to find out how many cases have involved sections 312 and 316(a). It
appears there are 205 cases for 312 and 1395 cases for 316(a) as of
the week before this conference began. I am not sure whether these
figures represent cases under the two sections or merely citations to
them - nor did I have time to check this out.
But I do have one figure ready at my fingertips. The last time I
taught my course in taxation of corporations and shareholders, there
were twenty-seven sessions, each running an hour and five minutes.
One of those sessions was devoted entirely to the limitation on dividend income and its ramifications. I did resent having to give up'
1/27th of my allotted time to such an unworthy cause.

DIVIDEND DISTRIBUTIONS-

A

SPECIAL

PROBLEM

HOWARD G. KRANE*

The subject that I have been assigned is "Dividend Distributions,"
particularly as affected by provisions of the Deficit Reduction Tax
Act of 1984.1 My discussion assumes that there is going to be a continued double tax system, that is, that corporations will be taxed on
their income and that shareholders of those corporations will be
taxed on distributions out of corporate solution whether there is an
earnings and profits limitation or not.
The provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 19842 which affect
dividend distributions deal with: (1) debt financed portfolio stock;3
(2) certain dividends from regulated investment companies;4 (3) corporate shareholder basis in stock reduced by reason of extraordinary
dividends;5 (4) distributions of appreciated property by corporations; 6 (5) capital gains distributions from regulated investment companies and real estate investment trusts;7 (6) denial of deductions for
certain expenses incurred in connection with short sales; 8 (7) accumulated earnings tax;9 and (8) changes in the definition of earnings
* Attorney, Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago; A.B., Grinnell College; J.D., University
of Chicago.
1. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (Tax Reform Act of 1984), Pub. L. No. 98-369,
98 Stat. 494 (1984).
2. Id.
3. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (Tax Reform Act of 1984), Pub. L. No. 98-369,
§ 51, 98 Stat. 494, 562-64 (1984).
4. Id. § 52, 98 Stat. 494, 564-65 (1984).
5. Id. § 53, 98 Stat. 494, 565-68 (1984).
6. Id. § 54, 98 Stat. 494, 568-71 (1984).
7. Id. § 55, 98 Stat. 494, 571-72 (1984).
8. Id. § 56, 98 Stat. 494, 573-74 (1984).
9. Id. § 58, 98 Stat. 494, 574-76 (1984).
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and profits. 10
Those are the provisions in this bill that can be viewed as relating
to the dividend distributions issue. I'm not going to talk about all of
them, rather I'm going to talk about a few of them. My thesis is
that, assuming we have a double tax system, these provisions make
sense because they will tend to eliminate discontinuities. They may
not be the best solutions, but I think they begin to restore a balance
to the Code.
Some of the problems which these changes address can be illustrated with simple examples. Assume that an oil company decides to
take its oil interests, which it has held for years, break them up into
working interests with a right to receive a royalty with respect to
those working interests, and put all or part of the royalty interests in
a grantor trust. Assume that the company has a zero basis in the
royalty interests and that it distributes interests in the trust to its
shareholders as a dividend. Assume further that among the company's shareholders are corporations who are dealers in the company's shares and that, at the time of distribution of the royalty
trust, these corporate shareholders have a long position in the shares,
holding them as inventory. What are the results for such a corporation on the distribution under current law? Under the law as it is
today, and until it is changed by legislation, the dealer corporations
pay no tax on the trust interests they receive and are treated as having a tacked-on holding period from the oil company for those interests. When a dealer corporation sells the trust interests, even the
next day, it gets long-term capital gain, since, of course, it is not a
dealer in the royalty trust units. And when it sells its oil company
stock, it gets an ordinary loss measured by the difference between its
original cost for the oil company share and the post-distribution
value of those shares, which should be reduced by about the value of
the royalty trust units. That magic was the law before the 1984 Act
changed things.
The new legislation corrects the royalty trust type of discontinuity
in several ways. Before I describe the 1984 changes, however, let me
give a second example.
In large corporate take-overs today, there is often as much as 40
to 50% of the stock owned, at the time the take-over becomes effective, by arbitrageurs, many of whom are corporations. In those takeovers, which involve a substantial amount of cash and a substantial
amount of stock, a corporate shareholder might be well advised to
tender enough for cash so that essentially it receives half cash, and
half stock. If the shareholder can report the cash as a dividend, it
will pay tax on only 15% of the cash because of the dividend re10. Id. § 61, 98 Stat. 494, 579-83 (1984).
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ceived deduction. At the same time, its basis in the stock received in
the exchange will be its full basis in the stock surrendered, resulting
in a short-term capital loss on sale of the stock. This is often a
favorable transaction for an arbitrageur, much of whose income may
well be short-term capital gain. Essentially, the transaction eliminates about half the proceeds from income, and creates a short-term
capital loss.
It could be argued that the simplest way to deal with both the
royalty trust and the dividend/short-term loss situations would be to
eliminate the dividend received deduction for portfolio holdings of
stock; i.e., unless a corporation owns a threshold amount of stock of
another corporation, dividend income is treated like a dividend to an
individual - no 85% dividend received deduction, and no tack-on
holding period for property distributions. However, that approach
may not be politically feasible.
Another method to eliminate these discontinuities, (and the new
legislation starts to approach this), is to provide that unless a corporation holds stock for some long period of time (e.g., one year) there
is no dividend received deduction. The legislation adopts a modified
form of this approach, but only in the case of extraordinary dividends. It provides that if a corporation does not hold stock for more
than one year, and if during that period of time it received an extraordinary dividend, any amount that is excluded under the 85%
dividend received deduction will reduce its basis accordingly in the
stock." In most cases this would prevent the results described above
for the royalty trust case and the reorganization case.
I did some arithmetic to see if the change will result in the right
amount of tax, and found that it will. For example, in the reorganization case it generates the tax result the arbitrageur would have
had but for the dividend received deduction. Thus, assume a corporation buys stock for $50 per share, tenders half for $25 in cash and
half for stock, and then sells the stock received in the exchange immediately for $25 per share. If the corporation paid tax on the full
$25 dividend, and had a $25 short-term loss which offsets $25 of
gain, the net tax effect would be zero. Under the new rule, the corporation will be fully taxed on $3.75 of ordinary income, i.e., 15% of
$25. The remaining 85% that was excluded from income, i.e.,
$21.25, will reduce the corporation's basis in the stock received on
the exchange to $28.75 so that when it sells the stock for $25 it will
11.

Id. § 53, 98 Stat. 494, 565-68 (1984).

recognize a short-term capital loss of $3.75. For a taxpayer with substantial amounts of short-term capital gain, the net tax is zero,
which is what it should be.
The result achieved by decreasing the basis in stock subject to an
extraordinary dividend could be achieved in other ways. However,
one reason for choosing to adjust basis is that if you t6ok the other
obvious approach, which would be to say that you have to hold the
stock for a year or more before you get the 85% dividend received
deduction, people might be filing tax returns before the required
holding period had run on stock paying dividends. If you imagine the
administrative complications of filing when the dividend received deduction is uncertain, and then amending returns as necessary, I think
the basis reduction method seems to be a neater way to get to a
similar result.
A second provision, which affects the royalty trust transaction in
particular, is one which says that if a corporation receives a dividend
in property from another corporation, its holding period for the property received (even if it has a carryover basis under section 301)12
does not start earlier than the holding period for the stock with respect to which it was received. 13 (If gain is recognized, the recipient
corporation has a fair market value basis in the property, and the
holding period starts at the time of the distribution.) As far as I'm
concerned, I think this provision, even though it is complicated and
will add a lot of complexity and new questions to the law, essentially
eliminating the royalty trust transaction.
Another provision making sense is the one that says if a corporation borrows money to buy stock, and the stock pays dividends on
which the corporation can take an 85% dividend received deduction,
there ought to be a limitation on interest deductions, as if the 85%
excluded from income were treated like tax-exempt income, to which
the rules of section 265 apply.' 4 I think the provision doesn't have
the teeth it ought to have because it is very weak in terms of identifying amounts borrowed to purchase stock. You almost have to borrow the money on the day you buy the stock to have the disallowance. Therefore, I think the provision is even weaker than section
265 is with respect to municipal bonds. At least this change is a step
in the right direction.
The last provision I want to talk about is the short sale provision.
Under pre-1984 law, if someone sells stock short and pays the lender
of the stock the amount of a dividend that is declared and paid on
that stock during the period of the stock loan, the borrower/short12.
13.
§ 54, 98
14.

I.R.C. § 301 (1982).
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (Tax Reform Act of 1984), Pub. L. No. 98-369,
Stat. 494, 568-71 (1984).
Id. § 51, 98 Stat. 494, 562-64 (1984).
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seller gets an ordinary deduction for the amount paid, as a cost of
producing income. The proposed provision says if the short-seller
closes the sale in less than sixteen days, 15 the amount paid to compensate for the dividend is not deducted, but is capitalized as part of
the cost of closing the sale.1 6 The other change is if amounts related
to the short sale are deductible then they must be treated as an interest expense for purposes of section 163(d) and section 265.17 I
think this provision is going to be greeted with a big round of yawns
from the investment community because it does not do anything.
The transaction described above, which creates an ordinary loss on
borrowed securities, is typically a year-end transaction, involving a
sufficient period of time so the sixteen-day requirement should not be
difficult to meet.18 What people are doing, usually at the last minute
after searching their soul and harrassing their tax lawyer and tax
accountant for shelters, is what is known as the short dividend roll.
All they do is short a stock just before its dividend date and pay an
amount equal to the dividend, all in December. On January 2nd,
they close the short sale (hopefully at a gain by the amount of the
dividend). What they have done is convert ordinary income into
short-term gain, and recognize the gain in the following year. (They
hope, of course, to convert the short-term gain into long-term gain
with another transaction.) These taxpayers are still going to be able
to do the roll, although they will have to accept a slightly longer
period during which they are subject to market risk. Consequently, I
don't think there would be a significant impact unless a long holding
period, say three or six months, were required. Such a long period
might eliminate the year-end dividend roll. However, sixteen (or
even forty-six) 19 days will not, in my judgment, eliminate all of the
year-end transactions.

15. Id. § 56, 98 Stat. 573-74 (1984). See infra note 19.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. See infra note 19.
19. Since this speech was given, the conference committee changed the required
holding period to 46 days. This will have some effect on taxpayers, but the conclusions
presented will still be true in many cases.
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FEW COMMENTS ON EARNINGS AND

PROFITS AND DIVIDEND ABUSES BY A
DEVIL'S ADVOCATE

LAWRENCE M. STONE*

A discussion of fundamental change in the taxation of corporate
income should include the implications of some kind of integrated
tax system. Many of the problems that are being looked at here are
fundamentally related to that. A lot of the Wall Street gimmicks
described by Walter Blum and Howard Krane obviously relate to the
classic system of corporate taxation combined with lower tax rate for
capital gains. That system has a good deal of support in this country
from surprising sources. For example, management of large publiclyheld corporations likes it and might even be in favor of Wally's suggested removal of the earnings and profits limitation. Several years
ago, there was a great wave of popularity for some form of integrated corporate-individual income tax. Indeed, both presidential
candidates, Ford and Carter, ran with those planks and promised
that soon after they got elected that some form of intergrated tax
would be the first order of business. The opposition to that proposal
came from certain sources that you might expect: people who think
for various ideological and political reasons that corporations ought
to pay lots of taxes. But the really telling opposition came from corporate management. Corporate management likes the system under
which dividends are of already taxed corporate income are taxed at
high ordinary income rates, so that you get double taxation of income if there are distributions. They also like the other side of that
coin, namely, a shareholder can realize on his share of accumulated
* Attorney, Irell & Manella, Los Angeles; Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley (1966-1979); A.B., Harvard University; J.D., Harvard Law School.
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earnings by selling your stock and be taxed on a capital gain. Those
two things are fundamental to our present system of corporate taxation. They, of course, mightily discourage the distribution of corporate earnings which is what management likes. If we were to move
to an integrated system this pattern of heavy retentions of earnings
would change in form of significant distributions.
I certainly do not support the abuses we are talking about and
which are under consideration in the Tax Reform Act of 1984. On
the other hand, I think if we continue to solve such problems in the
context of the present system, we can do some very strange, irrational, and very complicated things. It seems to me even though people have been saying this for many years, the system is indeed in
danger of collapsing under its own weight. If we "perfect" this system, we will make it so complicated that maybe we will give it its
final push, ending up with a consumption tax or some other substitute for a progressive income tax. Therefore, since a lot of these issues are not earth-shattering, I view with horror this 1984 Tax Act1
because a lot of its provisions are not well thought through, react too
quickly to problems, and add to the Code in such a way that the
country's best tax scholars at this conference cannot figure out what
the new laws would means. There are certain extremes that have to
be covered, but until we come up with really fundamental change,
the burden ought to be against any tinkering changes.
There are many changes present in the 1984 Tax Act that Deputy
Assistant Secretary Ronald Pearlman frankly stated he is still a little
disturbed about because he has not quite worked out all the
problems and ramifications. Several provisions were being redrafted
day and night by staff. One is the problems is that the staff has not
really decided what the problem is let alone how they want to solve
it; while Congress does not even understand the problem. That is a
very bad way to legislate.
As for earnings and profits, I mentioned there is no rule of natural
justice which says that distributions from corporations have to be
taxable to the extent of earnings and profits. It seems to me we could
have had an entirely different section 301 rule which says that first
the shareholders can take back some or all of their initial investments. This would be a great simplification and not entirely unfair or
unjustified. Although I do not necessarily push it, if you want to simplify rules consider this rule: if a million dollars of capital were put
into a company, allow that company to distribute a million dollars
tax free. That would be true whether it was loaned or put in as capital. All other distributions would be taxable as dividends. That is a
1. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (Tax Reform Act of 1984), Pub. L. No. 98369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984), was signed into law July 18, 1984.
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very fundamental simplification that would avoid a lot of problems
we have, albeit it would certainly not be supported by the management of many public corporations. Since the retained earnings may
be lost tomorrow in the business, this is hardly like letting a creditor
of a sound debtor get principal back before being taxed on interest.

